The 2010 Annual General Meeting of shareholders approved a claw back provision in the remuneration policy for the Board of Management. This provision provides the Supervisory Board with the option to claw back variable pay components paid to members of the Board of Management in the event that such variable pay components were based on financial information which is shown within a certain period of time to be materially incorrect.

Pursuant to the rules of the performance share plan and provision II.2.10 of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the Supervisory Board has the power to adjust the vesting schedules if, given the circumstances, this would reflect a fairer measure of performance, provided that targets, in the opinion of the Supervisory Board, are not more easy or difficult to be satisfied.

The Supervisory Board has decided that where, in the event of a takeover, the pay-out under the performance share plan is between 100 percent and 150 percent, the Supervisory Board will, taking into account the performance of the company prior to the takeover bid, at its discretion decide whether the projected outcome is fair and may decide to adjust the pay upwards or downwards within the bandwidth mentioned. This does not affect the discretion the Supervisory Board has to correct the variable remuneration of the Board of Management upwards or downwards in exceptional circumstances. It is noted that a takeover would not influence the SAM or DJSI sustainability ranking of the company and therefore the Supervisory Board will in such event primarily take into account the company’s TSR performance.

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