Anti-takeover provisions and control
According to provision IV.3.11 of the Code, the company is required to provide an overview of its actual or potential anti-takeover measures, and to indicate in what circumstances it is expected that they may be used. The priority shares may be considered to constitute a form of anti-takeover measure. In relation to the right of the Meeting of Holders of Priority Shares to make binding nominations for appointments to the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board, the Foundation Akzo Nobel has confirmed that it intends to make use of such rights in exceptional circumstances only. These circumstances include situations where, in the opinion of the Board of the Foundation, the continuity of the company’s management and policies is at stake. This may be the case if a public bid for the common shares of the company has been announced, or has been made, or the justified expectation exists that such a bid will be made without any agreement having been reached in relation to such a bid with the company.
The same shall apply if one shareholder, or more shareholders acting in a concerted way, hold a substantial percentage of the issued common shares of the company without making an offer. Or if, in the opinion of the Board of the Foundation Akzo Nobel, the exercise of the voting rights by one shareholder or more shareholders, acting in a concerted way, is materially in conflict with the interests of the company. In such cases, the Supervisory Board and the Board of Management, in accordance with their statutory responsibility, will evaluate all available options with a view to serving the best interests of the company, its shareholders and other stakeholders. The Board of the Foundation Akzo Nobel has reserved the right to make use of its binding nomination rights for the appointment of members of the Supervisory Board and of the Board of Management in such circumstances.
In the event of a hostile takeover bid or other action which the Board of Management and Supervisory Board consider to be adverse to the company’s interests, the two Boards reserve the right to use all available powers (including the right to invoke a response time in accordance with provisions IV.4.4 and II.1.9 of the Code), while taking into account the relevant interests of the company and its affiliate enterprise and stakeholders.